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be most favorable after the war, because the favorable forces need
not spend themselves in price skyrocketing as they did last_ time,
but rather can exert their most powerful influence to an outburst in
production that should permit the United States to achieve levels
heretofore unknown, and levels that" will keep the tax base high,
therefore, the tax yield high-all to maintain unimpaired the highest
integrity any, debt ever had-'-the debt of our government.

THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
HERBER'r HEATON

University of J1innesota

This subject is not of my own choosing. I was drafted, and· must
make three conscientious objections to the assignment. In the first
place I am not a prophet. In the· second, I do not regard any political institution, distribution of power, or economic system as
final, but history gives no clue to indicate what the next phase in
the development of an empire or of a social order is likely to be.
And in the third place, I cannot do either justice or mercy to· a
quarter of the land surface of the world and to a quarter of its·
population in thirty minutes.
Let me begin by considering what is this Empire with whose
future we are concerned. Some Britons would suggest it has 110
future because it is already a thing of the past, and ·has given place
to, or been transformed into, the British. Commonwealth of Nations. If empire means the exercise by one nation of politicar control over other peoples of diverse origin and culture, the new name
is more accurate than the old. ,vorld War I lifted the already internally self-governing dominions-Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa_:_to the rank of nations. The contributions they
made to that war were a substantial fraction of the British Empire's total effort. They were'larger still when measured in terms of
the dominions' assets in human or physical resources; New Zealand·
lost one in every 66 of her whole population, Australia one in every
93, while our figure was one in every 2,000. They overshadowed the
contrioutions made by many small nations; Canada for example,
lost more men than Portugal put into the field. Thus at a great
price the overseas dominions gained the right to be grown-up partners,· associates, members of a British Commonwealth of Nations,
and this title was hatched while the war was on. In addition they
won recognition as nations in the world when they secured direct
representation at the peace conference, signed the Treaty of Versailles, became foundation members of the League of Nations, and in
three cases were given control of territory they had conquered, as
"mandatory powers." ·

· PRoCEEDINGs,' VoLUME ELEVEN,

1943

91

The consequences of that development of a generation ago are 110w
clear. In the imperial conference of 1926, the position of Great Britain
and of the overseas dominions was put into words. The much-quoted
description reads: "They are autonomous communities within the
British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another
in any aspect of their domestic or foreign affairs, though united by a '
- common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members
of the British Commonwealth of Nations." What has autonomy meant? The answer_s are abundant.
The younger d_ominions have established their own embassies in
, Washington, Paris, Moscow, Chungking, arid elsewhere. They have·
their high commissioners iu each capital of the Commonwealth to
ser, e as inter-dominion ambassadors. They have negotiated treaties
with foreign governments and with each other. Diplomatic actions
taken by Britain do not bind any of her associate nations unless they
definitely accept them. When Britain signed the Locarno Pact in
1925, and gave her pledge to help France if she was attacked by
Germany, but to go to the aid of Germany if France ,vas the ag. gressor, the dominions were not committed to help Britain if the
need arose, since they took no part in the negotiations. Similarly during the thirties, when so many of us were crying, "Why don't the
British do something?" the British had to remember that they had
110 claim on support from the overseas dominions if they did intervene in Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Spain.
They did not even know what the other dominions would do in
September, 1939, when Britain declared war 011 Germany. The decision to come into the war or stay out was one to be made by each
dominion. Australia and New Zealand promptly said, "Of course we
are in it," and did not bother to make a formal declaration of_ war,
but Eire, Canada, and South Africa exercised their sovereign right.
The Canadian parliament deliberated, and decided well-nigh unanimously to come in ..The South African parliament heard its premier
recommend a policy of neutrality;·it heard its deputy-premier, General Smuts, recommend a break with Germany; then it voted, and
by the narrow m[],rgin of 80 to 67 it decided on war. Eire had long
before announced that in the event of war she would remain neutral, and has doiie so. The German ambassador is· still in Dub,lin;
there has been no black-out; if a flying fortress made a forced land.: .
ing in Eire its crew would be interned; the landing of American
troops in Ulster was violently protested by Dtiblin, even though
Ulster is part of, the United Kingdom and not of Eire; the use of
Irish harbors has been refused to the United States, though neutral
_ Portugal granted the use of her harbors and air-bases in the Azores;
and Dublin has rejected every suggestion from Washington that she
sever diplomatic relations with Berlin or close her ports against the
arrival of Nazi refi1gees. If that is not autonomy, I don't know
what it is.
1
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Autonomy is only one s·ide of the Commonwealth currency. If
you examine Canadian coins1 you ,will find King George's head on
one side, and an elk, beaver, or maple leaf on the other. On the
Australian currency there is the king's head and a kangaroo or a
couple of ostriches, or some other representative of the antipodean
· flora or fauna. And so on, throughout the Commonwealth, except in
Eire, where one side has a picture of an ancient Irish harp as backing for pictures of pigs or poultry. The use of the royal head symbolizes the crown as the constitutional link-the only one-between
the parts of the Commonwealth, but it is not the head of the Emperor of the Commonwealth. George VI is Empei·or of India, but
not of the Empire. There is no such office, no imperial constitution,
legislature, executive, judicature, tariff, tax system, defense system, or even membership clues. There are six dominions; each uses
the same person to serve as its king; and in each the king observes
the same rules, acting on the advice of his ministers, who in turn are
responsible· to the parliament of their dominion. The Canadian
parliament instructed its ministers to advize George VI of Canada
to declare that Canada was at war with Germany-and did so
about a week after George had been advized by his British ministers to declare that the United Kingdom was at war with Germany.
This is all that "united by a common allegiance to the Crown"
means in terms of constitutional forms and powers, but symbols
still mean a lot more than that to most of us, and a common king
is as good as a11y other symbol that the wits or emotions of mankind have yet been able to devize. ·
Th(; reality behind the symbol is the "free association" of the six
Commonwealth nations-or the five, if we leave Eire out for many
purposes. It is interesting to note how Canadian, South African, and
Australasian students see the Commonwealth. Professor Trotter, a
Canadian, speaks of it as "a free and voluntary partnership or association of nations." Dean Bailey of the Melbourne Law School says
it is "an association or organization for common action of a group of
communities historically linked by settlement or conquest with
Britain." General Smuts, the South African statesman who fought
the British so brilliantly in the South African War of 1899-1902,.
describes it as "a group of sovereign states, working together, living
together in peace and in war under a system that has stood the
greatest strain to which any nation can be subjected." The Canadian
Prime Minister described the working rules of this partnership, association, or group as "close consultation, close cooperation, and effective coordination of policies."
There is no time to spare for giving many examples of this consultation, cooperation, and. coordination. The consultation nowadays can be very close and even continuous. The high commissioners get together in each capital, the coming of the intercontinental telephone allows the prime ministers to ring each other up
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whenever they wish, while trans-oceanic flying. enables two or even
all of them to get together in conference at short notice. Cooperation
and coordination have been marked, especially in times of crisis.
In 1982, for example, when international trade had collapsed under
the burden of the depression, of our heightened tariff, and of quotas
or exchange controls, the dominions gathered in Ottawa and worked
out tariff agreements which aimed at preserving and stimulating
the flow of goods.between themselves.·
When war drew near, five of them cooperated in establishing a
Coinmonwealth Air Training Plan in order to get good flyers in
abundance· and in quick time. Canada undertook the administration
of this scheme, and if you have seen young men walking 'round the
Twin Cities wearing the R.A.F. blue uniforms, but with "Great
Britain," "Canada," "Australia," "South Africa," or "New Zealand"
on their shoulders, you may have gained an inkling of the scope of
the training plan.
Since 1989 cooperation and coordination have been many-sided,
with each dominion doing the job for which it was best fitted.
Britain bought all Australia's wool-clip in order to strengthen that
dominion's :financial position. Australia swung her primary production and manufacturing industries into line to supply many of the
needs of the Near East and India. Canada did likewise, and when
the British supply of dollars required for buying Canadian produce
ran out, Canada made a free unconditional gift of a billion dollars
worth of supplies in 1942, with more to follow. In short the Com 1
monwealth was a pioneer version of the United Nations.
A moment ago I quoted some descriptions of the Commonwealth
made by inhabitants of the younger dominions. An Englishman, or
rather a Welshman, remembering something these others had overlooked, said the Commonwealth is "ari association of free states with
a tail of dependent states." At the top of that tail is India, which
in less than a century-and really in the last quarter of a century,
since 1919-has advanced to complete self-govermnent in the
eleven British Indian provinces. In addition Indians sit in eleven of
the fifteen seats around the Viceroy's central executive council
table, hold nearly all the high civil service positions, occupy nearly
all the public health, engineering, and judicial posts, and do all the
provincial administrative jobs. Indians fill the provincial legislatures, and control the Indian ministers in them; they occupy the
overwhelming majority of the seats in the central legislature as
well.
Lower down the tail we encounter about fifty other parts of the
dependent empire. Ceylon, Bermuda, and Southern Rhodesia are
, now near to full self-government; the others are further away, but
are moving up. Most of this dependent empire is under British control, but some of it is under that of the other dominions. Canada,
for example, rules the arctic far north, which is now becoming im-
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, portant because of air routes. South Africa holds the.mandate over
ex-German Southwest Africa. Australia was given Papua in New
Guinea in 1906, and then received a mandatae over German New
Guinea, which she had captured in 1914. New Zealan9- has one or
two Pacific islands which she held before 1914 or received as mandates. Hence these four junior dominions have little empires of their
o~vn, and we might well talk of a British Commonwealth of Empires.
1\iletaphors and parables are dangerous devices, but perhaps I
can sum up this description of the Commonwealth in one. Let me
try bas~ball. The dominions have gone all the way 'round and have
crossed the home plate to home rule. India is on third base. Some
of the other players are on second or first, while other parts, such as
Nigeria with its 20,000,000 natives, are out on the practice field
learning to substitute tax systems, budgets, public works departments, schools, hospitals, experimental and demonstration farms,
judicial pr~cedures, roads, tractors, and fertilizers for the slaveraiding, inter-tribal war, witch-doctoring, head-hunting, cannibalism, soothsaying and soil-scratching which used to be their form of
sport.
If a more serious si111ile is desired, I might suggest that of a
species, except that I know no science. Let me risk it, and say that
the Empire which took shape in that great age of trans-oceanic
empire-building which followed the discoyery of America and of
the all-sea route from Europe to the Indian Ocean, was a species
which proved able to modify and a·clapt itself in an environment
that was subject to far-reaching change.
At least that simile is better than the one which was popular
a hundred years ago. In those clays men used to say that an empire
was like an apple tree. The apples would certainly fall off when they
were ripe. But the British people's ability to adapt their own form
of parliamentary government to democratic ideas and to transplant
it overseas prevented the apples from falling off. Or there was the
family metaphor, which said that children rebelled, left home, and
disowned their parents when they felt strong enough to do so. Evidently this does not necessarily happen if the youngsters discover
that they are free to leave home and disown the old people. Even
Eire, which became self-governing in 1922 and has since declared
herself a republic and taken a number of steps to emphasize her
independence, has never declared that she is quitting the Commonwealth. When the question is no longer "Can I go out?" but
"Where do I go?", it may seem better to remain a partner in a big
show than a lonely little nation out on one's own arid in clanger of
being ·swallowed up by some new empire-builder.
The future of the Commonwealth depends on the strength of the
ties which keep a group of free nations together. Some of them are
historical, and history has a way of creating conditions and tracli-
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tions which-for good or ill-are tenacious. The British are where
they are over the face of the earth for just the saine reason that we
are here. The men who founded the East India Company from
which British India grew were also the founders and financiers of
Virginia and the Pilgrim Fathers and Massachusetts Bay. The parallel between their overseas movement and our overland westward
movement is too close to allow us safely to throw stones. The hand
of history is not a dead hand. It decided that India should be British
rather than French or Portuguese or Dutch or Russian; that Canada, having ceased to be French, should eventually become Canadian
rather than Amei:ican; that Australasia was to be British (rather
than French) ih sovereignty and population, and· radically democratic in character; and that the ocean routes which bound a maritimE
. empire together must be made secure by the possession of strategic
naval bases and ports of call.
Some of the ties are economic. In their growth the colonies werE
far more dependent on Britain than she was on them. Their immigrants and their capital were drawn chiefly or entirely from the
, mother country, and they found their chief market .for _their foodstuffs and raw materials in the crowded industrial populations of
the British Isles. On the other hand the British were not nearly so
dependent on the overseas empire; the world was their market and
supplier of the things they needed, and of that world the colonies
were only a part-perhaps a third. Hence they pursued a cosmopolitan policy of free trade with all countries and continents.
Today these conditions are. changed, but not entirely. The rise
of other great industrial powers created a demand for dominion raw
materials and gave Britain rivals in supplying the dominions with
manufactured goods. Canada is an outstanding case; for at least a
generation she has sold more to us and bought far more from us
than to or from Britain. Similarly she has drawn far. more of her
capital in recent years from New York than from London. In addition the development of her own manufactures has reduced her dependence on British factories. Yet Canada can find little or no
market in the United States for hel' prairie wheat
other foodstuffs, and there is no other large market for them except the
British.
In the other dominions the dependence on Britain as market and
as source of suppl5· is far greater; Eire sells over 90 per cent of her
exports there, New Zealand over 80 per cent, and Australia over 50
per cent; and these three get 40 to 60 per cent of their imports from
her. They have drawn increasingly on the United States and other
in.dustrial countries for their supplies, and under the stress of war
have expanded their industrial plants greatly. In addition Britain
has had to sell ·many of her overseas holdings of stocks and bonds
· to pay for war supplies. The interest and profit from these used to
be spent in buying food and raw material; or to put it another way,

or
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the debtor dominions used to service their debt by exporting staple
products to the creditor. In the future Britain will not be able to
buy them with dividend checks or bond coupons. She will therefore have to buy by exporting her manufactured goods, her shipping, and by commercial, insurance, and banking services. She estimates that her exports must increase by 50 per cent if she is to buy
abroad what she used to buy. Either the dominions and other countries must buy more from her or she will have to reduce greatly
the purchases she makes from them; and if she has to do the latter
every dominion, as well as every foreign country which used to sell
her great quantities of butter ( e.g., Denmark) or of cotton ( e.g., the
United States) will have a hard time finding other markets for its
produce. If Britain is too poor to buy, the whole Commonwealth
will feel the impoverishing effect; and so will nearly every foreign
country, large or small.
The third tie is that of defense. Through the period of their
growth the colonies had no need to worry about defense, because the
British navy was so strong that no other power was in a position to
launch an attack on them or on· any other part of the world. The
colonies could therefore go their own way, increase their self-governing powers, emphasize their growing independence and nationality,
and do it all without spending more than a few cents a head on
defense. In an age of safety you can afford to be as centrifugal as
you like, and build up a lot of small nations. When the safety goes
the lot of those who have self-determined themselves into independence becomes very hazardous. Self-government foi· the Philippines might have been a safe policy in 1900, or earlier; but once Japan
became a great power in the Western Pacific, self-government might
mean suicide. Similiarly self-government for India might in the 10th
century have meant handing the peninsula over to be ta.ken by
Russia, and in the 20th century to be ta.ken by Japan or other possible possessors of large appetites.
·
Even in the piping peace of last century, fear of external danger
was not quite unknown. Fear of an attack by us pushed the Canadian provinces into federation 'in the sixties, and the appearance
of the Germans in the south-west Pacific helped to pull the six
states together into the Commonwealth of Australia in 1000.
The British Commonwealth has never assumed that it could
defend itself against any conceivable combination of powers, but
only that it could take care of the seas and make a. substantial contribution in men, money, and materials to its allies on land. That
strategy was severely strained in World War I when one ally (Russia) fell out, when France lost much of her industrial area, aud'
-ivhen the submarine proved so menacing. It was even more so when
France fell in _1940, when Italy came in, and when for twelve grim
months the British Commonwealth stood solitary but solid. The
epic of that "Year Alone," with its defiance of the Luftwaffe, its
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defence of North Africa, and its puncturing of :Mussolini's empire,
, well justified Mr. Churchill's assertion that if the British Commonwealth and Empire lasted for a thousand years, "men will still say
'This was their finest hour.'" No one can say what might eventually have happened if Hitler had confined his efforts to the western
front and had left Russia alone; and it is also impossible to say what
might have happened if in such a situation Japan had joined its
European Axis partners and had declared war on the Commonwealth but had left us alone. I don't think, however, that anyone
will be accused of being an alarmist for feeling that an Axis concentration on the Commonwealth would have been irresistible.
The conclusion of these two world war experiences is inescapable.
The British Commonwealth needs friends and allies, or better still
must be part of a world peace organization. In that 'respect it is not
alone, for no large power that we can conceive can do without
friends and allies or fail to be safer in a world organized for peace.
We certainly could not stand alone against all the rest of mankind.
We have shown our realistic sense of that by our entry into the first
World War and by the policy we were pursuing prior to Pearl
Harbor as well as since. I think it is equally certain that Russia is
in the same position, but since my concern here is with the British,
let me stick to their problems.
In the first place Britain will emerge from this war greatly weakened in many of the ways in which she was strong. Her foreign
trade has shrunk by at least half, and will be hard to recover, as
may be her shipping business. She has lost most of her overseas
investments, and the _income from them. She will probably be a
debtor country rather than a creditor; already India has had such
an excess· of sales to her that the whole Indian debt on British in, vestments has been wiped out, and in addition Britain is now in
debt to India to the tune of $4,000,000,000. So also with Canada,
Australia, Argentina, and of course there is our own lend-lease
creditor position. Finally, before the war Britain's population was
reaching the stationary level, was becoming middle aged, and
seemed doomed to decline in the decades ahead-not a unique
prospect, but an·uncomfortable one.
· In the second place, the dominions in the Pacific are not large
enough to defend themselves unaided, and if Britain is engrossed
in a life and death struggle in Europe, she cannot give very much
help east of Suez. The aid has to come from us, and our own intei'.·ests impel us to give it; for whatever we may feel or think about
the Commonwealth we could not be very comfortable if either Germany or an Asiatic power controlled the west-central and southwest Pacific. It may be that the Australasian dominions will step
up their efforts to increase immigration and development, so that
within a generation their population may grow from its present
8,500,000 to perhaps twice that figure. If they can do that they will
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be less vulnerable, but still not strong enough to deal unaided with
a first class power if it determined to annex them.
In the third place, Canada's dual position as a member of the
Commonwealth and as a part of the Americas has been emphasized by the events of the last generation. She has no desire to leave
the Commonwealth, and no desire to throw her· lot in politically
with the United States. She might have sheltered behind the latest
version of the Monroe Doctrine and played little part in the present war; but that possibility was not given a moment's thought by
her leaders, and she shouldered her full share of the obligations of
Commonwealth partnership. Some of us were a bit annoyed in 1939
at this manifestation of her connection with the world outside; but
it should be noted tha:t the British counterparts of those "some of
us" often get annoyed at Canada's insistence in her North Americanism. Canada is in the Commonwealth and Canada has a big
neighbor to her south. Those are the two basic facts of her consciousness. Consequently, like Australia and N cw Zealand, she is
now fully a ware of our existence and our importance to her, to the
Commonwealth, and to the world. I think we have become a lot
more aware of her importance to us, and this is a healthy situation
all 'round.
One question remains. What of the future of India in the Commonwealth; or even what of the future of Il1(;lia? Seven out of every
ten citizens of the Commonwealth live there, and if they left it they
would greatly reduce it in size, population, and prestige. What happens in India in the years ahead is up to the Indian people themselves. Up to date the introduction of self-government by instalments has not met any insuperable obstacles. True, Gandhi and his
Congress party have accused the British of offering too little too
late. To this the British have replied that the Congress wanted
too much too quickly. The achievement so far has been in the field
of provincial government. Indian legislatures now control the law-~
making in each province, Indian ministers administer the laws and
the provincial civil service is virtually all Indian. This is a remarkable achievement, and has been possible because it encountered no serious impediment. The next step-the "federation of the
whole peninsula-has, however, failed to bridge the chasms which
divide Indian society. The first is that which separates the selfgoverning provinces of British India from the six hundred native
states which are still ruled by princes, rajahs, nabobs, and so forth.
The second is the racial and religious chasm: on one side stand
about 90,000,000 Moslems, on the other side are 300,000,000 Hindus; the dislike is mutual, ineradicable, and intense. The third is
the caste system, with its watertight compartments, and at its base
60,000,000 outcasts, untouchables,· "depressed classes." Adel- to
these divisions the lack of everi three or four popular tongues, the
wide range of social habits, and the absence of inter-marriage be-
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tween races or classes, and the task of creating E pluribus wiuni
·becomes gigantic. Two efforts have failed. A federal constitution
drafted in 1935 was rejected by all the sections, races, classes, and
religions. In 1942 Sir Stafford Cripps, socialist, internationalist, and
anti-imperialist was sent to India to see if he could bring unity. His
mission was twofold. The leaders of the Indian parties were invited
to enter -the Viceroy's e·xecutive council and take over every department and post except that of commander-in-chief. They were
asked to be ready,· as soon as the war was over, to gather in a constitutional convention a1id work out an accepted plan for an Indian
Union. This- plan London pledged itself to accept, even if it pro_vided, not for dominion status within the Commonwealth, but for
self-goyernment outside the Commonwealth. With the Japs on the
frontier, the Indian parties still could not sink their differences
enough to accept either invitation. The nearer the hour of their
liberation drew, the. more they were at sixes and sevens; and even
India's deepest sympathizers have to confess their belief that civil
war would h3: ve broken out the minute the people of India were left
free of British rule and restraint.
The future of the Indian, o·ne-fifth of the human race, is unpredictable. Will the British stay there until Indians resolve their differences? If and when they do resolve them and create an Indian
Union, will the union endure, or will it go to pieces when put to the
strain of racial, religious, and social differences? If it works, will it
secede from the Commonwealth? .No one can answer these questions. India now has many new assets of strength that she lacked
a generation ·ago. Three million volunteers have been trained in the
army-twice as many men as the whole membership of the Con.gress party. They have learned to handle trucks, tanks, planes, big
guns and little ones. Industry has gone ahead by leaps and bounds
both before and since 1!)39. The country is rich, or at least some
people in it have become rich through industry and the war. ·Britain
owes India four billion dollars, and the amount will be larger before the war ends. Does one disown a debtor? If the British' go out, do·es
· anybody else come in? At any rate, watch India in the years ahead.
She 1nay become what we have so optimistically assumed that China
is destined to become-a great power.
·
For the rest of the Commonwealth, its future is wrapped up in
that of the world at large. If we can achieve a settlement which has a
chance to endure, and can restore international trade ,oll' some basis
of sanity and health, the political future of the British Commonwealth need not worry anyone. Certainly the Commoi1wealth can
contribute much to that peace and security, for its ·1ands are in
every ·continent and _its trade routes on every ocean. If no real world
security can be secured, then the British Commonwealth, like ourselves, will have to weigh its policy in terms of a balance of forces
in which international anarchy can be restrained only by interna-

